

## REVIEW ARTICLE

### PHILIP II AND THE GREEKS\*

One of the most encouraging trends in classical scholarship is the growing interest in peripheral areas of the Greek world. For a long time the study of Greek history was centered mainly on the city-states, almost to the exclusion of other regions except insofar as they impinged on the life of the *polis*. But in recent years we have mined our sources for traditional Greek history nearly to the point of exhaustion (major new interpretations become rarer all the time), and have discarded many of the constricting notions of romantic philhellenism. At the same time, scholars have begun to pay attention to the societies on the marches of the city-states: societies which were marked by independent characteristics and development, but which existed historically as components of the Hellenic world. Macedon was such an area.

The progress of Macedonian studies has been fitful. Neglect is due in part to the presence of Alexander the Great, whose career, half conquest, half romance, has overwhelmed the literature on Macedonia, and obscured the society from which he sprang. It is also due to the pervasive (and simplistic) view that the mid-fourth century B.C. was a period dominated by a titanic struggle between the "civilized" areas of Greece (represented by Demosthenes and the Athenians) and the northern "barbarians" (represented by Philip and his Macedonian warriors). Moreover, Macedonia has long been a part of the hinterland of modern Greece. At a time when several major classical sites had been dug in central Greece, and when Schliemann, Dörpfeld, and Evans had opened up the Bronze Age in the Peloponnesus and Crete, Macedonia still lay under Turkish control (the area was added to the modern Greek state only in 1913); and it has remained a politically sensitive region throughout much of this century. Funds for excavation in Greece have usually been directed toward the more accessible, famous, and tourist-oriented sites in the south, which are connected with a literature and history that once formed the core of traditional education in the West. Thus ancient Macedon has remained relatively obscure.

We may be reminded that less than a century ago Macedonia seemed a virgin field for exploration. In 1886 the great antiquarian, Sir William Ramsay, was in need of an assistant. Fresh from Oxford, the young David George Hogarth was instructed to make his way to Athens to learn something of epigraphy before joining Ramsay in Asia Minor. Hogarth quickly tired of Athenian antiquities and ran off to Macedonia, hoping to see if anything remained at Pella and Aegae. In May of 1887 he wrote to his sister: "I got 28 unpublished inscriptions at Salonica. . . . We are now off to Phrygia; I shall keep my eyes open for things Macedonian, for Alexander marched through the heart of the country from Apamea to Gordium."<sup>1</sup>

In 1897 Hogarth published a volume entitled *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*.

\* *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*. By J. R. ELLIS. Aspects of Greek and Roman Life. London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1976. Pp. 312; 4 maps, 4 tables; 1 chronological list in text. £9.50 (in U.K. only).

1. Quoted in a comprehensive memoir written by C. R. L. Fletcher shortly after Hogarth's death in 1927, "David George Hogarth," *GJ* 71 (1928): 321.

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It had been preceded by works on the subject by Niebuhr, Holm, Niese, Droysen, Grote, Freeman, and others. But Hogarth's book was distinctive in several respects. First, most of the earlier works (Droysen's being a notable exception) had considered Macedonian affairs only in the context of general Greek history, and not as a separate subject deserving independent treatment. Hogarth's volume is a monograph, or, more accurately, a pair of biographical essays, about two Macedonian monarchs. Second, Hogarth was one of the first scholars of the period to take seriously Polybius' injunction that historians should leave their libraries and get out into the field to witness the events and places they intended to describe.<sup>2</sup> Hogarth's familiarity with the topography and antiquities of the many lands traversed by Philip and Alexander lent a vividness to his narrative which no library-bound scholar could emulate.

Perhaps the most distinct break with traditional scholarship was Hogarth's elevation of Philip of Macedon to the rank of a first-rate general and statesman, echoing Diodorus Siculus' pronouncement that Philip "had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time, and because of the extent of his kingdom had made himself a throned companion of the twelve gods. He had ruled twenty-four years. He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle."<sup>3</sup>

Hogarth shared little in the sentimental philhellenism that characterized most nineteenth-century writers. Even the German scholars, most of whom openly admired Philip as the unifier of Greece (a model for their own national unification in the 1860s and 1870s), were caught in a dilemma of their own making, because the man they admired was also widely regarded as a barbarian who had threatened the higher civilization of Athens. That view was fostered not only by those pro-Athenian attitudes which have always pervaded Western education and culture, but also by Philip's misfortune in having as his most formidable adversary the greatest of Athenian orators. Demosthenes' castigations of Philip have echoed through the centuries, and only recently have we pierced the armor of Demosthenes' idiom to examine the reality of Greek politics in the mid-fourth century.<sup>4</sup> In advance of his time, Hogarth wrote: "As it had been given to Thucydides to exalt a series of raids into a great national war, so the transcendent oratory of Demosthenes has led historians to invest his opposition to Philip with an importance of which assuredly Philip was not aware."<sup>5</sup> One friendly reviewer said: "This sentence is one of many showing how sturdily the author has cast aside the perverting influence of an incomparable literature on the historical judgment."<sup>6</sup>

Hogarth's influence on subsequent scholarship, however, was limited. With rather

2. Polybius 12. 25e. 1, 25g. 3, 25h. 1, 27. 1-7.

3. 16. 95. 1-4; translation by C. B. Welles in the Loeb edition.

4. Our admiration for elegance of style has often colored our view of events. The controversy between Demosthenes and Philip is not the only case; one need only think of how Caesar has suffered under the grandiloquence of Cicero. Plutarch wrote, "It is dangerous to incur the hatred of a city skilled in eloquence and poetry" (*Thes.* 16. 3); he might have said "the hatred of a city or a man."

5. *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* (London, 1897), p. 82.

6. B. Perrin, *AHR* 3 (1897): 129.

little new information about Macedonia itself, twentieth-century studies have tended toward interpretative biographies of the two pre-eminent fourth-century kings, Philip and Alexander. The history of modern scholarship on the latter virtually forms a separate subject and has been dealt with elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> Philip for his part continued to be regarded either as the aggressor against higher Hellenic culture, or as the visionary who united Greece and thereby created the stable base from which Hellenism was spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean world (a view which has been taken especially by German historians). A number of biographies have appeared during the past half-century;<sup>8</sup> whatever their respective merits, they have hardly moved beyond the guidelines laid down in the nineteenth century. One had come to suspect that Philip studies were at a standstill.

It is now apparent that what was required for a deeper understanding of the Macedonians and of their kings was serious *Quellenforschung* and the description of material remains. The groundwork for both was laid by N. G. L. Hammond, beginning in 1937 with his articles on Book 16 of Diodorus, which is a major source for Philip's career.<sup>9</sup> Hammond also gained a first-hand knowledge of topography by walking the region before the Second World War (and by serving as a British liaison officer in occupied Greece during the war). He has since continued to cultivate his interest in ancient Macedon.<sup>10</sup> The first fascicle of Macedonian inscriptions, edited by C. F. Edson, has been published, although the material it contains dates from the Hellenistic and Roman periods.<sup>11</sup> A new generation of scholars,<sup>12</sup> influenced by E. Badian's important revisionist views on sources and internal politics, and free from the shackles of pro-Athenian sentiment, has advanced Macedonian studies in the journals over the last decade.

Archaeology has made a major contribution. Few regions of modern Greece hold so much promise for excavation as Macedonia. Most of the great classical sites in the south have been dug; prehistoric and Bronze Age excavations are well established throughout Greece and the Aegean as the result of recent interest in the early period of Greek history. Now it may be Macedonia's turn for active and concentrated exploration. Professor P. M. Petsas and his Greek colleagues have demonstrated over the years that the Macedonian plain is an archaeological treasure house. They have labored without renown in the north, and our sympathy for

7. See, for example, U. Wilcken, *Alexander the Great*, trans. G. C. Richards, with preface, introduction, notes, and bibliography by E. N. Borza (New York, 1967), pp. xii-xxi; J. Seibert (ed.), *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt, 1972); and most recently, E. Badian, "Some Recent Interpretations of Alexander," *Alexandre le Grand: Image et réalité*, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 22 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1976), pp. 279-311.

8. E.g., Wilcken, "Philipp II von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee," *Sitz. preuss. Akad. Wiss. zu Berlin*, Philosoph.-hist. Kl., 1929, pp. 291-316; A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence, 1934); and F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren 346 bis 338* (Munich, 1938). The postwar period has seen P. Cloché's *Fondateur d'empire: Philippe II, roi de Macédoine* (Paris, 1955) and *Histoire de la Macédoine jusqu'à l'avènement d'Alexandre le Grand* (Paris, 1960), and the excellent early chapters in P. Green's *Alexander of Macedon* (New York, 1974). W. W. Tarn's monumental *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1948) contributed virtually nothing to internal Macedonian studies.

9. "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI," *CQ* 31 (1937): 79-91 and 32 (1938): 137-51.

10. The first volume of his *History of Macedonia* appeared in 1972 (Oxford), and a second is in preparation.

11. *IG*, 10.2, fasc. 1 (Berlin, 1972).

12. Among whom are A. B. Bosworth, H. Dell, R. M. Errington, P. Green, J. R. Hamilton, M. M. Markle, and R. D. Milns.

their solitude may now give way to hopes that their important work, for so long overshadowed by the more glamorous prehistoric and classical finds elsewhere, may at last gain deserved recognition.\* Pella is hardly touched. The site of Aegae remains for some a subject of debate. There exist impressive *tumuli* of questionable origin and purpose. Recent tomb excavations near Lefkadia, which have revealed a late fourth- and early third-century culture more sophisticated than we had reason to expect, seem to have raised more new questions than they have given answers. The excitement of discovery, however, is tempered by frustration over the agonizing slowness of the Greeks in publishing their finds; archaeological work in that country is complicated by politics at all levels, and by the meager allocation of funds for excavation in the more remote regions. At the international level, too, one hopes that a more generous spirit of cooperation will permit the material from the Macedonian sites in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to be made more accessible. The integration of this material with Greek finds would develop the wide context necessary to understand the ancient Macedonian culture. But despite these difficulties, the last quarter of this century may yet prove to be an era of fulfillment for Macedonian studies.

J. R. Ellis has been among the most active of the new generation of Macedonian scholars. The quality of his *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* confirms the competence he has demonstrated in a stimulating series of articles published in recent years. *Philip II* is based on a careful reading both of the exiguous sources and of recent scholarship on the ancient literary, epigraphical, and archaeological evidence. What makes it a valuable book is that it approaches its subject from the Macedonian point of view: by "point of view" I mean that Ellis' narrative is focused on the needs and interests of Macedonia as personified by its most important early king. Ellis sets out to provide an account of Macedonian expansion into Greece during the reign of Philip II, never forgetting that the Macedonian tale must unfold from within if we are ever to understand the process by which Philip's dynamism clashed with the weary and cantankerous *poleis* to the south.

The book covers events from about 360 to 336 B.C., which it is no easy task to describe. On the Macedonian side, the surviving evidence includes Diodorus (Ephorus), a handful of inscriptions, and some scattered references in later writers. The substantial body of Athenian material (Demosthenes, Aeschines, Isocrates) is colored by party propaganda, rhetoric, and fierce anti-Macedonian sentiment. It is a pleasure to report that Ellis has managed to see through much of the murk clouding these waters, and has produced a fresh diplomatic history of Greece during the middle of the fourth century. What emerges in his interpretation is the notion that Macedonian expansion was generated by the aspirations of the Macedonian people; it was a national phenomenon directed in an orderly fashion and given a particular form by Philip II. The path to empire was twisted, however, as the Greeks in general and Athens in particular misread Philip's intentions, and the king was compelled to use force when he would have preferred diplomacy.

Ellis' thesis may be summarized as follows. By the late 350s or early 340s Philip had already decided to invade Asia. Greece was incidental to his long-range goals: it

\* As this review was being readied for the printer, newspapers reported the opening of an important fourth-century tomb near Vergina, which the excavator, Professor M. Andronikos, believes to be the tomb of Philip himself.

was too poor to be attractive to a Macedonian king for whom the wealth of Asia was the prize—too poor in everything, that is, but men. Greek soldiers were, after his own, the best anywhere, and the prudent adventurer hardly wanted them as adversaries in his rear. Philip needed Greece for “security and coalition”; he wanted Asia for “military objectives and wealth” (p. 234).

Philip's first necessity was to secure the borders of the Macedonian nation, which had already been partially stabilized through several royal marriages, family alliances, and the development of the army as the symbol of unity and instrument of policy. There were two aspects of this plan. One was to protect the frontiers by seizing passes, building fortresses, establishing buffer states, developing alliances, annexing land, and installing friendly or neutral governments where appropriate. Thus the Macedonian marches in Thessaly, Epirus, Thrace, Illyria, and Paeonia were secured by force and the threat of force. Only occasionally was further military intervention necessary to maintain order. The second aspect of the plan was more troublesome in the long run. Philip's interest in the Aegean littoral was probably not intended to establish Macedon as a sea power, but rather to protect himself from the east, and to exploit, if possible, the rich resources of the Chalcidice. But a Macedonian move into this area would arouse the Athenians. For more than a century Athens' economic interests had involved her in the northern Aegean, and any expression of Macedonian influence there would need to take Athens' response into account. Ellis argues that the events of the period between 357 and the fall of Olynthus in 348 were determined by Philip's desire for a political settlement in the Chalcidice, by his attempt to formulate both Athenian and Chalcidician alliances, and by his resort to arms when diplomacy failed. In Athens, Demosthenes emerged as the leader of the anti-Macedonian faction, persuading his fellow citizens (though just barely) to join Olynthus in its struggle with Philip. Ellis' full discussion of this decade makes us aware that fourth-century diplomatic history is no less complex than that of the fifth century.

Still preferring peace to war with Athens, Philip pressed his diplomacy. In his discussion of the elusive “Peace of Philocrates” of the year 346, Ellis offers an illuminating analysis of the debate before the Athenian *demos*. We are given a detailed chronology of events in the middle of that year, as Greece verged on war, and a splendid account of the Amphyctyonic meeting which settled the Sacred War without wholesale slaughter. We witness Aeschines arguing that Athens should exploit the Peace of Philocrates for its own benefit, and Demosthenes proposing that the peace be used as a license to overthrow Philip. Philip himself appeared to be interested in setting up a multilateral arrangement which would guarantee security in Greece. He preyed upon anti-Spartan feeling in the Peloponnesus, upon the tangle of Amphyctyonic politics in central Greece, and upon disorder in the Thessalian federation. What hindered Philip's efforts was Athens' suspicion and fear—and Demosthenes.

The Peace of Philocrates was designed to make Athens Philip's partner in two ventures: (1) the Athenian fleet would support Philip in his expedition against Asia Minor, incidentally benefiting Athenian trade in that direction; and (2) Athens would accept a hegemony over central and southern Greece, with Philip's cooperation and military support. In short, Athens would become Philip's ally abroad and agent at home, and it is this role that the Athenians refused. It is Ellis'

thesis that Demosthenes saw the plan—incorrectly—as the vehicle for Philip's entry into Greece, whereas Philip viewed the proposed arrangement as simplifying the Macedonian exit from Greece into Asia Minor. If Ellis is correct, one is astonished at Athenian shortsightedness: in their insularity the Athenians evidently could not conceive of Philip's not being interested in them. One also suspects that much of the misunderstanding between the Macedonians and the Athenians was the result of a cultural clash. Each side judged the future from the viewpoint of its own past. To the extent that the historical experiences of Athens and Macedon had differed, so too did their expectations of what the treaty might mean for the future. When Philip realized that the plan was doomed, he moved to an alternative proposal, the Common Peace of 344. Athens amended that overture so as to make it unacceptable to a number of Greek states, if not to Philip himself.

Admirers of Demosthenes will find little comfort in Ellis' account of these matters. Ellis carefully scrutinizes the orator's arguments, which, made in the heat of controversy and with deliberate bias in the 340s and 330s, are still influential today. This account successfully exposes Demosthenes' duplicity and high-handedness, as he gradually ascends to a pre-eminent position in Athens. Ellis has composed a well-deserved indictment of Demosthenes, whose personal fortunes wax while hopes for peace in Greece wane.

Taking heart from some severe Macedonian setbacks in 340, Athens encouraged the formation of an anti-Macedonian faction in the north. Philip became convinced that peace with Athens was impossible, and, to forestall a more serious threat against his northern hegemony, he seized the Athenian grain fleet in the late summer of 340 on a flimsy pretext. Athens immediately declared war, and Demosthenes convinced Thebes to join on the side of the anti-Macedonian alliance. Philip's policy had failed. He had attempted to avoid a major conflict with the Greek cities by conciliation, by posing as the protector of weaker states, by proposing a Panhellenic settlement through the Amphictyonic Council, by offering to establish Athens as the leader of a new Common Peace, and by isolating Sparta and neutralizing Thebes. He had failed mainly because of Demosthenes. Now Philip was forced to pit Macedon against Greece. The weaker or uncommitted states were compelled to side with the Greeks, and the image of "Philip the Barbarian" came into being. It may be one of the ironies of ancient history that the "barbarian" had conceived a foreign policy so orderly and so rational as to be utterly alien to the Hellenic mind.

The issue was settled by force of arms at Chaironeia in 338. Ellis' discussion of the subsequent Panhellenic settlement follows the lead of Wilcken and Roebuck:<sup>13</sup> Philip made individual arrangements with a number of cities, but all were part of a complex plan of unity finally instituted in the Common Peace of Corinth. It is obvious that what was gained by Philip at Corinth in 337, only as the result of the Macedonian victory at Chaironeia, was not unlike what he had offered the Greeks in 346–344, and what he probably had preferred ever since assuming his throne. One of the strongest arguments supporting Ellis' view is that, having once settled the Greek question in 338–337, Philip turned immediately to preparations

13. Wilcken, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes," *SBAW* 1917, Abhandlung 10; idem, *Alexander the Great*, pp. 42–49; C. Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 B.C.," *CP* 43 (1948): 73–92.

for the Asian venture.<sup>14</sup> If the Greek settlement was not precisely what Philip had envisioned in 346, he had the Athenians to blame. The delay postponed the Asian expedition more than a decade. In 336 Philip was assassinated, and the crusade would be left to a younger, less temperate man.

My major reservation is that Ellis' description of Macedonian imperialism reads at the same time as a defense—and a persuasive one—of Macedonian actions, even though that may not have been the author's intention. Ellis' thesis is attractive to a modern audience looking back in dismay at the inability of Greeks to forsake their internecine hostility. Philip appears as a rational man, attempting to impose order on the Greek world with a minimum of disruption and interference in the internal affairs of the *poleis*. (Isocrates would have approved of Ellis' interpretation.) It is clear to us that the Greeks would have sacrificed little by accepting Philip's hegemony, and would have gained in return Hellenic stability and a profitable partnership in the Asian crusade. But was all this so clear to the Athenians? Why should independent *poleis*, who win our admiration for resisting the Persians in the early fifth century, be condemned for their refusal to kowtow to the Macedonians in the fourth? Even with allowances made for the obfuscation of facts and manipulation of opinion by Demosthenes, there must have resided in the minds of many Athenians (and of other Greeks as well) a genuine fear and suspicion of Macedon. What may appear to us to have been a sane foreign policy may have been greeted with trepidation by ordinary Greeks, since they had, out of their own experience, no reason to trust either the Macedonians or each other. Ellis fails to treat this problem adequately; one wishes he had shown more understanding of the basis of Greek misgivings about Macedonian intentions.

It may be unfair to criticize an author for what he has omitted, and admittedly Ellis' subject is Philip and Macedonian imperialism. But the matter of Philip's relationship with Alexander is germane to the question of Philip's royal stewardship, and it should have been considered in more detail, especially as Philip's schemes to organize Greece and to invade Asia coalesced. This is not to suggest a narrative history of the young Alexander (that is impossible, given the nature of our sources), but rather an account of Alexander's role in Philip's life and plans.

A book which places (correctly) so many events connected with Macedonian expansion in a geographical context deserves better maps. The maps lack the topographical detail which is necessary if one is to understand such an intensely geopolitical narrative; they are simply drawn outlines, within which is crowded an undifferentiated mass of place names. They are of little value to the reader.

This is a difficult book to read, since the complexity of the material itself is exacerbated by a narrative style which might with kindness be described as dense. Sentences are frequently very long and turgid. The author or his editor should have understood that the clearest historical style is the simplest and most straight-

14. In my view Ellis does not develop this point enough. Another supporting argument is that Philip did not bother to campaign against Spartan strongholds in the Peloponnesus. (Antipater and Alexander later paid a price for Philip's decision, when King Agis III led a general rebellion against Macedonian authority in Greece.) Moreover, Philip never attempted to take Athens, which had given him every reason to attack, and fully expected him to do so. The point is that the Macedonian warrior-king fought as little as possible, preferring the threat of force or diplomacy. His prudence in these matters is one of his most unusual traits.

forward, and that what might be acceptable intensity in a ten-page technical article is wearing in a two-hundred-fifty-page monograph.

Ellis has certainly advanced our understanding of Greek diplomatic history for the middle of the fourth century. The results of all the new research which is being done on Macedonia, results which are just beginning to be published, will show us whether his achievement is ephemeral or not. And Ellis' book itself will surely produce a response among students of the period. Much of what he has said may in fact be revised and enlarged, but that is the way of the historical sciences. As it stands now, the book is the best and boldest account of what is known about Philip and Macedonian imperialism.<sup>15</sup>

EUGENE N. BORZA

*The Pennsylvania State University*

15. Some details may best be mentioned in a note. *Pp. 21-44*: This first chapter offers a sound review of Macedonian history before the reign of Philip; it is especially recommended for students. *P. 22, map 1*: Troizen is misplaced. *Pp. 43-44*: E. doubts that Philip's hostageship at Thebes (369-367) from about the age of fourteen to sixteen caused him to learn or develop the military ideas he later used in reforming the Macedonian army. But why not? Thebes was at the height of her power, and Epaminondas was active. Can we not credit a fourteen- to sixteen-year-old with absorbing some lessons from the Thebans? Philip's own son would be regent at sixteen, and at eighteen would command the Macedonian left at the battle of Chaironeia. *Pp. 46-47*: E. argues (correctly) a position developed in the journals in recent years, that Philip was not regent for his nephew, the boy Amyntas, but rather that, when his brother Perdiccas was killed in a campaign against the Illyrians in 359, Philip claimed the throne and was supported by the army. *Pp. 52-56*: A fine analysis of the army, pointing out that it is difficult to know how much Philip reformed it. E.g., Philip did not invent the phalanx (the *pezetairoi* had existed for some time), but instead "made some remarkable advances in size, training and sophistication." *P. 62*: There is an odd, Edwardian phrase here: "but the wives [Philip] marshalled were not, as it happened, to be remarkable for their fecundity." Seven wives, *all* not remarkable for their fecundity? *Cherchez l'homme!* E. does concede that Philip was "deficient" in the production of sons. *P. 64*: The Meltemi are disruptive to Aegean navigation, to be sure, but mainly in the summer, not in the autumn, as E. suggests. *P. 213 and n. 17*: E. makes a sensible argument that Aridaeus, Philinna's son, born in 357, was destined for the throne until his feeble-mindedness or some accident (the work of Olympias?) rendered him incapable. Just when Alexander replaced Aridaeus is problematic. We have no contemporary reference implying that Alexander is the heir until he is ten years old (Aeschin. 1. 168, for the year 346). Isocrates (*Epist.* 5) writes to Alexander as the heir in 342, but by then Aristotle is already his tutor. E. seems to have forgotten that Aristotle was hired probably in 343. *P. 219*: E. states that the Asian expedition was scheduled to leave in 336. This is unlikely, since it was only in the spring of 336 that the advance party under Parmenio left. It would take Parmenio about a year to scout supplies and to set up the necessary stations and routes. It is more likely that the main body was scheduled to leave early in 335, rather than in late summer or early autumn of 336. Philip was murdered probably in July, and Alexander's lightning campaigns to restore Macedonian authority were concluded in 335. Thus Philip's death delayed the Asian invasion by only a year, from 335 to 334. *Pp. 223-27*: On the question of Philip's assassination, E. argues that neither Alexander nor Olympias was implicated. Alexander was already clearly the heir, and Olympias' standing (regardless of her marital status) depended on her son's position as future king. Alexander was not about to be replaced at the last moment by a king who had spent twenty years preparing for this day. Although E. prudently hedges on this tortured issue, one wishes he had explored in more detail the intrigue within the court itself, and had discussed especially the regional antipathies which Philip may not have completely eradicated. For example, Leonnatus and Perdiccas, the bodyguards who killed the assassin Pausanias, were both Orestians, as was Pausanias himself. Was it pure chance that the principals were all Orestians? Could the killing of Pausanias have been an attempt to salvage Orestian honor, or was it done to insure silence about an Orestian conspiracy? The other bodyguard at the scene was Attalus, not Philip's general, but the brother-in-law of Perdiccas. E. has dealt with these Macedonian internal intrigues elsewhere, but it is curious that these issues are not analyzed more fully at this dramatic moment. *Pp. 245-308*: Once again, this reviewer wishes that a special place in hell could be reserved for publishers who print scholarly notes at the back of a book and then compound the inconvenience by not providing adequate concordance between page numbers and note numbers.